在线咨询
中国工业与应用数学学会会刊
主管:中华人民共和国教育部
主办:西安交通大学
ISSN 1005-3085  CN 61-1269/O1

工程数学学报 ›› 2021, Vol. 38 ›› Issue (6): 763-777.doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1005-3085.2021.06.002

• • 上一篇    下一篇

碳交易背景下考虑消费者低碳偏好的产能共享策略研究

吴安波,   吴钰秀,   孙林辉   

  1. 西安科技大学管理学院,西安 710054
  • 出版日期:2021-12-15 发布日期:2022-02-15
  • 通讯作者: 吴钰秀 E-mail: 987551919@qq.com
  • 基金资助:
    陕西省教育厅专项科学研究计划—人文社科专项 (20JK0232).

Capacity Sharing Strategies under Carbon-emission-trading Mechanism Considering Consumer's Low-carbon Preference

WU Anbo,   WU Yuxiu,   SUN Linhui   

  1. School of Management, Xi'an University of Science and Technology, Xi'an 710054
  • Online:2021-12-15 Published:2022-02-15
  • Contact: Y. Wu. E-mail address: 987551919@qq.com
  • Supported by:
    The Special Scientific Research Program of Shaanxi Provincial Department of Education—Special Project of Humanities and Social Sciences (20JK0232).

摘要:

在以低碳减排为目标的绿色制造环境中,产能资源闲置与短缺外购之间的矛盾已成为制造企业低碳运营管理的重要议题,因而碳交易背景下实现产能共享、提高资源利用率变得至关重要。基于博弈论模型,探讨了碳交易制度对制造商产能共享策略的影响。以产能充足和产能不足的两个竞争型制造商为研究对象,研究了消费者低碳偏好下制造商产能共享的最优决策问题,并以数值模拟和分析予以验证。结果表明:产能转移数量、单位产品转移价与产能充足制造商的减排水平呈负相关,产能转移数量与产能不足制造商的减排水平呈正相关,当两制造商的减排水平在一定范围时,产能共享策略可使两制造商利润均得到提高。

关键词: 碳配额, 低碳偏好, 产能共享, 博弈论

Abstract:

Under the green manufacturing environment with the low-carbon emission purpose, the contradiction between idle capacity resources and shortage has become one of the critical problems in the operation of manufacturing enterprises. It is vital to realize capacity sharing and to improve the utilization rate of resources. A game model is utilized in this paper to explore the impact of Carbon-emission-trading on manufacturers' capacity sharing strategies. We consider two competitive manufacturers with sufficient capacity and insufficient capacity as the research setting and study the optimal decision problem of manufacturers' capacity sharing under consumer's preference for low-carbon products. At the same time, we verify the model by numerical simulations. The results show that the amount of capacity transferred and the transferring price per unit product are negatively correlated with the emission reduction level of the manufacturer with sufficient capacity. In contrast, the amount of capacity transferred is positively correlated with the emission reduction level of the manufacturer with insufficient capacity. When the carbon emission reduction level of the two manufacturers is within a specific range, the profits of both manufacturers will increase.

Key words: carbon quota, low-carbon preference, capacity sharing, game theory

中图分类号: