Association Journal of CSIAM
Supervised by Ministry of Education of PRC
Sponsored by Xi'an Jiaotong University
ISSN 1005-3085  CN 61-1269/O1

Chinese Journal of Engineering Mathematics ›› 2024, Vol. 41 ›› Issue (3): 551-567.doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1005-3085.2024.03.013

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Robust Asset-liability Investment Game with Time Delay under Partial Information

YANG Lu1,  ZHANG Chengke2,  ZHU Huainian2,  XU Meng3   

  1. 1. School of Management, Guangdong Polytechnic Normal University, Guangzhou 510450
    2. School of Economics, Guangdong University of Technology, Guangzhou 510520
    3. School of Management, Guangdong University of Technology, Guangzhou 510520
  • Received:2021-11-08 Accepted:2022-12-25 Online:2024-06-15 Published:2024-08-15
  • Supported by:
    The National Social Science Foundation of China (21FJYB025); the Philosophy and Social Science Project of Guangzhou City (2023GZGJ15).

Abstract: This paper discusses the robust asset-liability management problem of maximizing the expected utility of the terminal wealth under partial information with delay, that is, the investors can observe the risky asset price with random drift which is not directly observable in the financial market. It is reduced to a partially observed stochastic differential game problem. This paper tries to an effort to find the equilibrium strategies by maximizing the expected utility of the insurer's terminal wealth with delay under the worst-case scenario of the alternative measures. By using the idea of filtering theory and the dynamic programming approach, we derive the robust equilibrium strategies and value functions explicitly. Finally, some numerical examples are presented. Obviously, the value function is higher in the full information case than it in the partial information case. Therefore, investors should collect more information related to investment as much as possible in order to make more informed decisions.

Key words: robust equilibrium strategies, filtering theory, delay, utility maximization, partial information

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